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Abstract 
In this paper, we evaluate the impact of unilateral divorce on crime. First, using crime rates 
from the FBI´s Uniform Crime Report program for the period 1965-1998 and differences in the 
timing in the introduction of the reform, we find that unilateral divorce has a positive impact on 
violent crime rates, with an 8% to 12% average increase for the period under consideration. 
Second, arrest data not only confirms the findings of a positive impact on violent crime but also 
shows that this impact is concentrated among those age groups (15 to 24) that are more likely to 
engage in these type of offenses. Specifically, for the age group 15-19, we observe an average 
impact over the period under analysis of 40% and 36% for murder and aggravated assault arrest 
rates, respectively. Disaggregating total arrest rates by race, we find that the effects are driven 
by the Black sub-sample. Third, using the age at the time of the divorce law reform as a second 
source of variation to analyze age-specific arrest rates we confirm the positive impact on the 
different types of violent crime as well as a positive impact for property crime rates, controlling 
for all confounding factors that may operate at the state-year, state age or age-year level. The 
results for murder arrests and for homicide rates (Supplemental Homicide Report) for the 15-24 
age groups are robust with respect to specifications and specifically those that include year-state 
and year-age dummies. The magnitude goes from 15% to 40% depending on the specification 
and the age at the time of the reform. 
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1. Introduction 
Family as institution has undergone a “complete make-over” in the U.S. and in the Western Hemisphere 
during the last fifty years. Institutional and technological changes such as abortion and contraceptive methods 
have not only changed the gender roles (Goldin and Katz, 2002) but also the family backgrounds faced by the 
new generations. Children as never before are as likely to growth up in a one parent or a blended family, or 
with a working mother. Among the most important institutional changes was the reform in divorce legislation 
to the extent that it has been called the “Divorce Revolution”. Specifically, unilateral divorce, the right of one 
spouse to ask for a divorce without the consent of the other, is the aspect of the reform that has captured the 
greatest attention in the literature during the last twenty years.
1
 
Initially, the scholarly debate was focused on the impact of unilateral divorce on divorce rates (Peters, 1986; 
Friedberg, 1998; Gruber, 2004). Nowadays, there is growing consensus in the literature regarding a short-term 
increase in divorce rates (Wolfers, 2006). This evidence has been related by scholars to a greater selection 
into and out of marriage in adopting states, and therefore to an increase in the average match-quality of new 
and surviving marriages.
2
 Despite the direct effects of unilateral divorce on divorce rates, recent research has 
focused on the role of the reform in several other aspects of individual behavior. Some examples are studies 
on family formation (Drewianka, 2004; Rasul, 2004; Alesina and Giuliano, 2007), marriage-specific 
investments (Stevenson 2007) or female labor supply (Gray, 1998; Chiappori, Fortin and Lacroix, 2002; 
Stevenson 2007b). The evidence in these studies also points towards a change in behavior in those couples 
formed under the new legislation.   
Stevenson and Wolfers (2006) provide a link between unilateral divorce and crime. Specifically, they 
consider two types of offenses: domestic violence and homicide committed by a spouse
3
. They show that in 
states that introduced unilateral divorce there is a sizable decline in domestic violence and in the number of 
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 Nevertheless, the process began before 1950 in a number of states, by removing fault grounds, for example adultery, desertion or 
physical abuse, in order for spouses to ask for a divorce (Gruber, 2004). In the early 1970's some states started introducing not only 
no-fault grounds in the legislation but also allowing one spouse to ask for a divorce without the consent of the other spouse, which has 
been called “Unilateral divorce”. An additional aspect of the reform is related to the division of property and assets in case of divorce. 
By the end of 1970s, the majority of the states had moved to a regime where property was more equally divided. In the same period, 
many states eliminated the consideration of fault regarding asset division and spousal support settlement.  Nevertheless, not all states 
adopting unilateral divorce introduced these reforms simultaneously so we can sort out the impact of unilateral divorce from the 
others. For a careful review of the characteristics of the reform, see Mechoulan (2005). 
2
 This interpretation gains support from recent evidence on the lower divorce rate among couples married under unilateral divorce, 
compared with those married under mutual consent (Mechoulan, 2006). Additionally, evidence supports a reduction in the average 
duration of marriages that end in divorce (Matouschek and Rasul, 2006) and a decrease in marriage rates (Rasul, 2004). 
3
 In addition to these two outcomes, they find that unilateral divorce produces an 8–16 percent decline in female suicide. 
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women murdered by their partner.  Individuals living in an unwanted relationship once the reform came into 
place could either leave the relationship or improve their situation to reduce the level of violence. Given the 
nature of the outcomes (use of force), and biological differences in terms of physical strength between 
genders, this analysis captures mostly the “benefit” for individuals (women) who were locked into a bad 
marriage and who, as a consequence of unilateral divorce, profited from an easier divorce setting. It also 
points toward a better selection into marriage.
4
 
Even though most of the recent empirical research is supportive of the idea that unilateral divorce has been 
beneficial for married adults and specifically for women, the current evidence also suggests that the reform 
may have had some negative effects on children. For example, Gruber (2004), using a sample of adults  (25 to 
50 years old) from the US Census data for the period 1960-1990, studies the long-term effects of unilateral 
divorce on children. He finds that those adults who were exposed to the reform as children have lower 
educational attainments and lower family incomes, marry earlier but separate more often, and have higher 
odds of adult suicide.
5
 More recently, Cáceres-Delpiano and Giolito (2008) go further down the causal chain 
and study the impact of unilateral divorce on outcomes of children together with those of their mothers, using 
U.S. Census data for the years 1960-1980.  We find that mothers in adopting states whose eldest child was 5 
years old or more at the time of the reform are approximately 16% more likely to be divorced and 16% more 
likely to be below the poverty line. Their children also face a 4% to 6% decrease in family income, and they 
are 16% to 24% less likely to be enrolled in a private school. The results for child outcomes show that 
children of pre-school age at the time of the reform (age 0-4) are more likely to repeat a grade. The analysis 
for the same cohorts of children ten years later (using the 1970-1990 Census), shows an increase of the 
probability of living in an institution (men), or falling below the poverty line (women), consistent with 
Gruber‟s (2004) negative findings on adults. 
Independently of the channels behind the relationship between unilateral divorce and negative family and 
child outcomes, the previous findings can be easily linked with some factors that the sociology and 
criminology literature consider determinant in defining the start and length of a criminal career. Some 
examples of these studies are those that link crime with family structure (Matsueda and Heimer, 1987; 
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 Using data similar to Stevenson and Wolfers, Dee (2003) finds that unilateral divorce significantly increased the number of husbands 
killed by their wives. Stevenson and Wolfers do not find an effect on husbands killed. One way to reconcile these results,  given Dee‟s 
shorter sample period (1968-1978), is that his results may come from marriages formed under mutual consent (and where husbands 
were willing to divorce under the new legislation). If unilateral divorce implied selection into marriage, those effects may have 
disappeared once new marriages formed under unilateral divorce were taken into account. 
5
 Johnson and Mazingo (2000) using 1990 US Census data examines the amount of time individuals were exposed to unilateral 
divorce laws as children, finding results consistent with Gruber (2004). 
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Sampson, 1987; Sampson, Laub and Wimer, 2006), poverty and inequality (Blau and Blau, 1982; Wilson, 
1987) or school completion (Rand, 1987).
6
  
The contribution of this paper is twofold. First, based on the literature which has already shown that unilateral 
divorce affects, at least in the short-run, not only family structure but also outcomes related with investments 
in the family, we study the potential effects of the divorce reform on aggregate crime. Second, we try to 
identify precisely the group in the population that was particularly affected, in order to give an interpretation 
to the potential channels. A closely related work in terms of the outcomes studied here is Donohue and Levitt 
(2001). Donohue and Levitt link the legalization of abortion in the early 1970‟s with the fall in the crime rate 
in the 1990‟s. Nevertheless, here we focus on a different question; we try to take into account the several 
issues raised in the empirical debate developed over Donohue and Levitt‟s original work. (Joyce, 2004 and 
2006; Foote and Goetz, 2005; Donohue and Levitt, 2004 and 2006).  
In this paper, we exploit two sources of variation and use three different types of data to evaluate how 
unilateral divorce affected crime. The first source of variation comes from differences in the timing of divorce 
law reforms across the United States.  Using crime rates from the FBI´s Uniform Crime Report program 
(UCR) for the period 1965-1998, we find that unilateral divorce has a positive impact on violent crime rates, 
with an 8% to 12% average increase for the period under consideration. Then, using UCR Arrest data 
disaggregated by age group, we not only confirm our previous findings but we are also able to identify that 
the impact concentrates on the most relevant age group for this type of offenses (15 to 24 year olds). In 
particular, the results for the 15-19 age group reveal an average impact over the period under analysis of 40% 
and 36% for murder and aggravated assault arrest rates, respectively. The fact that the impact concentrates 
mostly on the middle to long term suggests that the impact comes from those individuals who faced the 
reform as children. Disaggregating total arrest rates by race, we find that the effects on the aggregate rates are 
driven by the Black sub-sample, while for whites we only see an impact in the first four years after the law 
was enacted. 
In order to identify more precisely the groups of the population affected by the reform and to check the 
robustness of our results, we introduce a second specification that uses the age at which a given cohort was 
first exposed to the reform as an additional source of variation. We apply this second source of variation to 
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age-specific arrest rates and to homicide rates from the Supplemental Homicide Report. This source of 
variation allows us to control by potential confounding factors at the state-year, state-age or year-age level 
that could contaminate our previous results (such as the crack epidemic, for example)
7
. Here we are able not 
only to confirm the positive impact on the different components of violent crime, but we also find a positive 
impact on property arrest rates. The results for murder arrest rates and for homicide rates are robust with 
respect to specifications.  The results for murder rates confirm that individuals who were four years old or 
older are those who face an increase in the probability of engaging in crime. We also find a greater impact in 
murder arrests for individuals who were aged 20-24 at the time of the reform. The higher impact for this 
group might be linked to their own marriage disruption rather than those effects suffered as children. 
However, our findings in aggravated assault arrest rates, which are greater for the youngest cohorts exposed 
to unilateral divorce, are consistent with our long term findings in aggregate rates.  
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we briefly review the related literature. Section 3 describes 
our empirical strategy and the data sources used in the analysis. In Sections 5 and 6 we present our results for 
the two specifications described above, respectively. Section 6 concludes. 
2. Unilateral Divorce, Family Disruption and Crime 
The current evidence points toward a better marriage selection as a consequence of unilateral divorce. 
However, since divorce legislation acts as the dissolution clause of a marriage contract, the unilateral reform 
can be seen as a retroactive change in this dissolution clause for those marriage contracts already in place at 
the time of the reform. Therefore, the change in legislation may have produced different effects on those 
individuals who had taken marriage, fertility or investment decisions based on mutual consent divorce rules. 
Even though those effects are transitional overall (Wolfers, 2006), they may become permanent for children 
of those families “trapped” in the transition.  Therefore, it is particularly important to identify whether the 
effects come from those individuals who faced the reform either as adults or as children.  
In the case of those who faced the reform as adults, they can be affected either through their own marriage 
disruption or through a more difficult setting for individuals with risky backgrounds in order to access the 
benefits of marriage, due to the increase in marriage selection fueled by unilateral divorce. Specifically, 
criminology literature has linked family structure as a key factor that defines the start and length of a crime 
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 See Fryer et al. (2005) for a detailed description of the crack epidemic.  
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career. Sampson, Laub and Wimer (2006) describe three channels, among others, which explain the 
relationship between marriage and desistance from crime. First, marriage creates a social bond that defines 
obligations, mutual support and self-discipline which increases the cost of criminal activities. Second, 
marriage defines obligations that reduce leisure activities outside of the family (Osgood and Lee, 1993) and 
therefore changes an individual‟s routines and patterns of association with deviant peers (Warr, 1998). Third, 
marriage increases male crime desistance because of the direct monitoring exerted by female spouses.  
Empirical research regarding the relationship between family structure and crime is not new in criminology or 
in sociology literature.
8
 For example, Rand (1987), examining data for 106 male offenders from the follow-up 
study of the 1945 birth cohorts in Philadelphia, finds that transitional life events were positively related to 
crime (as well as crime characteristics), such as marriage, completing school, and receiving vocational 
training in the military. Horney, Osgood and Marshall (1995) analyze the history of current offenders 
(incarcerated men), finding that particular life events affect their criminal behavior, at least temporarily. They 
find that moving in with one‟s wife doubles the odds of stopping a man from offending (compared with 
moving away), and moving away from one‟s wife doubles the odds of starting to offend (compared to 
moving-in). Sampson, Laub and Wimer (2006), expanding crime history for 500 high-risk boys from the 
original data of Glueck and Glueck (1950), find an average reduction of approximately 35 percent in the odds 
of crime associated with being married. 
Research from Wolfers (2006) shows that unilateral divorce only affected divorce rates in the short-run 
(around 8-10 years). Therefore, we should expect only transitional effects on crime if an individual engages in 
(or resumes) criminal activities because of their own divorce. However, those effects might become long 
lasting if the increase in crime comes from children who were negatively affected by the law, especially 
through parental divorce (Gruber, 2004). Extensive, and impossible to summarize in this paper, is the 
literature that has linked divorce with factors related to a start in crime among children. Single-parent families 
are more likely to live below the poverty line; approximately one in two single mothers lives below the 
poverty line (Garfinkel and McLanahan, 1986). Furthermore, the disruption of the family implies a reduction 
of income for both spouses. Duncan and Hoffman (1985) estimate that the income of mothers and their 
children after divorce is 65% of their pre-divorce income, whereas the income of divorced men is about 90% 
of their pre-divorce income. Recently, Page and Stevens (2004) have found that, in the year following a 
divorce, family income falls by 41 percent and family food consumption falls by 18 percent. Six or more 
years later, the family income of the average child whose parent remains unmarried is 45 percent lower than it 
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 A more in depth discussion can be found in Laub and Sampson (1990 and 2001) and Sampson, Laub and Wimer (2006). 
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would have been if the divorce had not occurred. Also residential mobility is more likely in one parent 
(mother only) households, which implies an adjustment not only to new neighborhood and leaving conditions 
but also the loss of social networks (McLanahan and Booth, 1989).  Specifically referring to unilateral 
divorce, Cáceres-Delpiano and Giolito (2008) find, using 1960-1980 Census data, that mothers of children 
aged 6-15 face a 4% to 6% decrease in family income because of the reform, independently of whether they 
divorce or not.  
It is a well-known fact that single-headed households, and especially those of black young mothers, are 
concentrated in disadvantaged neighborhoods with higher crime rates and poverty, low rates of employment 
and poor educational facilities (Wilson, 1987), with all these factors being positively related to the 
engagement in a criminal career. Additionally, children who have gone through a divorce are more likely to 
live in a household where their mother is working, and therefore have less supervision. However, Sampson 
(1987) examines race-specific rates of robbery and homicide by juveniles and adults in over 150 U.S. cities in 
1980, finding that black family disruption substantially increases the rates of black murder and robbery, 
especially by juveniles, although the effects are similar to those of white family disruption on white violence. 
His main hypothesis is that variations in rates of black family disruption are positively related to rates of black 
criminal behavior, independent of those factors (e.g., poverty) associated with families headed by females and 
frequently hypothesized as providing motivation for crime. To the extent that the disruption of families is 
linked primarily to the social control of juveniles and their peer groups, the effect of family structure on crime 
should be strongest for juveniles.  
3. Empirical Strategy and Data 
We follow Friedberg‟s (1998) coding of state divorce regimes and the dates of divorce reforms.9 There are 
five states that have not yet adopted any form of unilateral divorce: Arkansas, Delaware, Mississippi, New 
York and Tennessee. Of the forty-six states that currently have unilateral divorce regimes, eight had adopted 
some variant of unilateral divorce before the no-fault revolution during the early 1970s.
10
 In our analysis we 
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 However, our results are robust  to  alternative divorce coding such as that from Gruber (2004).The most important difference with 
Gruber (2004) coding comes from the fact that he considers as “non-adopting” those states that have unilateral divorce as well as 
separation requirements: Illinois, New Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina and the District of Columbia. In our analysis, we 
define an additional dummy variable that captures whether a state has separation requirements. See Table 1 for details. 
10
 They are Louisiana, Maryland, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Utah, Vermont, Virginia and West Virginia. These states are coded as 
“Pre-1968” in Column 1 of Table 1. 
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consider as “adopting states” those 38 states (including the District of Columbia) that adopted unilateral 
divorce in 1968 or later; while the remaining 13 states are considered “control states”. 
In the first part of our analysis, we use the natural variation resulting from the different timing of the adoption 
of unilateral divorce laws across states to estimate the effects of these laws on aggregate crime and arrest 
rates. Consequently, we use state-based panel estimation, including both state and time fixed effects in all 
regressions and state-specific trends. We opted for a dynamic specification, allowing the impact to vary by 
time since the reform was introduced, in order to differentiate short run from long term impacts of the reform 
(Wolfers, 2006).  
In the second part of our study, we use age-specific arrest and murder rates. Here we take advantage of an 
additional source of variation that comes from the age that a cohort faced the unilateral reform. This second 
source of variation allows us first to identify differential effects between individuals that have faced the 
reform at different points of their life. Second, since the source of variation is at the state-year of birth level, 
we are able to control by confounding factors that might operate at the state-year, state-age or age-year level. 
All our regressions are state population weighted.
11
 Finally, to control for serial correlation, we correct the 
standard errors by clustering by state, following Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004). 
The crime data in our analysis comes from the FBI´s Uniform Crime Report program (UCR) and from the 
Supplemental Homicide Report.
12
 The UCR data consists of information at the state level for the eight types 
of crimes that are considered the most important because of their nature or volume among all offenses (Part I 
offenses). These felonies are classified into two groups: Violent Crimes
13
 and Property Crime. Violent crime 
groups four offenses: murder and non-negligent manslaughter, forcible rape, robbery, and aggravated assault. 
Property Crime includes the offenses of burglary, larceny-theft, motor vehicle theft, and arson. 
Because the FBI data rely on police reporting, there are often problems of underreporting or downgrading of 
crimes. However, the use of aggregate information at different levels (state-year, state-year-age or state-year-
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 Similar conclusions we get performing unweighted regressions. 
12
 The UCR data has information for the whole period 1960-2005 with the exception of NY for which the information is available as 
of 1965. Therefore, we restrict the analysis for the period 1965-1998, because for other covariates the information is not available 
beyond the selected period.  Nevertheless, we checked the robustness by estimating a model for the whole period without controls; the 
results do not change qualitatively. 
13
 The Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) Program defines as violent crimes those that involve force or threat of force. The 
classification of these offenses is based on police investigation as opposed to the determination of a court, medical examiner, coroner, 
jury, or other judicial body. For more details, see the Uniform Crime Reporting codebook at 
http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/handbook/ucrhandbook04.pdf. 
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race) as well as analyzing different types of offenses allow us to draw conclusions based on results that are 
less sensitive to measurement errors.
14  
In this paper we use, first, the crime rates reported at state-year level for the period 1965-1998.
15
 We also use 
data on the number of arrests by type of offense and on homicide counts from the Supplemental Homicide 
Report (SHR). The number of arrests reported to the FBI UCR Program each year by police agencies in 
metropolitan statistical areas in the United States is disaggregated by age, sex, and race. The age detail is at 
single age for 15 to 24 year olds and grouped for the other ages. This level of detail is useful since it allows us 
to identify not only the population affected by the reform, but also the potentials channels. The third source of 
data consists of homicide offenders from the FBI‟s Supplemental Homicide Reports (SHR). These data are 
also available by state, year and single-year of age for the period 1976-1999; unlike the data on FBI UCR 
arrests, all ages are identified. The SHR account for approximately 92 percent of all known homicides, and 
just under 4 percent of cases lack information on age. The most significant problem in using SHR data to 
analyze offender characteristics, however, is the sizable and growing number of unsolved homicides 
contained in the data file. In this paper we used the imputation method created by Fox and Zawitz (2004).
16
 
In order to construct the arrest and homicide (SHR) rates, we use three sources of population counts. The 
state population by year is from Donohue and Wolfers (2005). We also use population counts disaggregated 
by state and age from Census US Intercensal County Population Data, which is available for all years starting 
in 1970. We finally use population counts disaggregated by state, year and race from the National Cancer 
Institute (SEER Population estimates), available since 1969. (see data Appendix). 
Figure 1 shows the comparative evolution between Adopting and Non-Adopting States for raw Violent and 
Property Crime rates, respectively. By “adopting”, we mean states adopting unilateral divorce in 1968 or later. 
For each of the panels we introduce two vertical lines signaling the years 1970 and 1975, which indicate the 
period that most states adopted the unilateral divorce law (see Table 1). We can see, first, that adopting states 
have a lower incidence of violent crimes than non-adopting states. On the other hand, however, adopting 
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 Stevenson and Wolfers (2006) check the FBI counts of total murders each year by state against murder counts gathered by the 
National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS). They find that these two data sources provide murder counts that are consistent with 
each other. 
15
 The UCR data has information for the whole period 1960-2005 with the exception of NY for which the information is available as 
of 1965. Therefore, we restrict the analysis to the period 1965-1998, because for other covariates the information is not available 
beyond the selected period.  Nevertheless, we checked the robustness by estimating a model for the whole period without controls; the 
results do not change qualitatively. 
16
 With this methodology, offender profiles for unsolved crimes are estimated based on the offender profiles in solved cases matched 
by victim age, sex, and race as well as year and state. However, our results are robust to the use of non-imputed offender data. 
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states have higher incidence of property crime for the period under analysis. Second, after (and not before) the 
unilateral reform started there is monotonic reduction in the gap in violent crime rates between adopting and 
non-adopting with almost no observable difference in the 1990‟s. On the other hand, the gap between 
adopting and non-adopting states in terms of property crime rates seems stable during the period, with a 
marginal tendency to increase after 1985.  
Figure 2 shows violent crime in its different transgressions. In order to stress the evolution during the period 
under analysis, we index the different crime rates by using 1965 as base year. Three elements are worth 
noting. First, the evolution of violent crimes goes hand in hand with the evolution of aggravated assault, 
which is the most significant type of violent crime in terms of volume. Second, adopting states did not begin 
catching up in terms of violent crime rates until 1975, which is, at least at a descriptive level, consistent with 
non-preexistent trends driving this profile during this period. Third, the faster relative growth of violent crime 
rates among adopting states in relation to non-adopting states occurs for the periods 1975-1980 and 1985-
1990. In fact, after 1990 both adopting and non-adopting states follow a similar profile for all violent 
transgressions, that is, a well-known and documented drop in crime rates after 1995. Finally, for “Murder” 
and “Forcible Rape” offenses, there is a mid–run relative increase among adopting states, which at the end of 
the period, however, is not perceptible. 
4. Aggregate Crime and Arrest Rates 
The following expression represents the first specification of interest, 
,      (1) 
with yst representing one specific crime or arrest rate for state s at time t,  δs and ηt, represent state and  year 
fixed effects, respectively. Finally, Zst stands for time-varying aggregate and policy state variables. Among 
these time-varying covariates we distinguish three groups of variables: Demographic variables, State 
Aggregate and Policy variables, and finally variables that have been associated with crime by previous 
studies. Demographic covariates include the fraction of African-American population living in the state, the 
state poverty rate, fraction of foreign-born population, the fraction of people living in metropolitan areas, the 
state-year age structure of the population and the interaction of the fraction of African-American population 
with the poverty rate, and fraction in a metropolitan area. Policy variables are the log of per capita income, the 
unemployment rate, and dummies for the requirement of fault for property division, separation requirements, 
11 
 
and equitable division of property, and covariates for welfare benefits
17
. Crime related variables are dummies 
for abortion accessibility by state and year and for the five states that legalized abortion prior to Roe vs. 
Wade,
18
  a dummy variable for the existence of the death penalty, the log of the lagged incarcerated 
population, and a dummy for the crack introduction in the mid-late 80's.
19
 
The variable of interest is U
c
st, which represents a series of dummy variables that take a value of one for those 
states that have adopted the unilateral reform after “c” years. To estimate the impact of the reform, γc, we rely 
on the standard source of identification that is usual in the literature of unilateral divorce, a Dif-in-Dif 
approach; not all states moved to the unilateral regime and those that adopted these new divorce laws did not 
move simultaneously to the new regime. We introduce a trend whose impact is allowed to differ among 
states, πs. By doing so, we try to prevent the estimated impact of the unilateral reform from just capturing pre-
existing trends in the selected outcomes.  
Table 2 presents the estimates of  in equation (1) with the natural log of violent crime as a dependent 
variable
20
. Each column corresponds to a different specification with the later columns controlling for an 
increasing number of covariates. The first column presents the basic model (“Basic”) including dummies by 
year and state just as explanatory variables. The second column includes demographic variables; Column 3, 
state aggregate variables; Column 4, variables that have been related to crime in the literature and Column 5, 
a linear trend whose impact varies by state.  
The results in Table 2 reveal great robustness in the findings among specifications. First, for all specifications 
we find that the unilateral reform is associated with an increase in the average violent crime rate for the period 
under analysis. The magnitude of this impact varies from 8.4 to 12.2 percent for the complete period (35 to 51 
violent crimes for every 100,000 people), depending on the specification, which is reported at the bottom of 
each column. Second, the impact monotonically increases during the years under analysis. While we cannot 
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 Welfare benefits variables include a dummy indicating the existence of the Aid to Families with Dependent Children Unemployed 
Parent Program (AFDC-UP), the food stamp guarantee for a family of four with no other income and the maximum AFDC rate for a 
family of four. 
18
 Abortion was nationally legalized in 1973 with Roe vs. Wade. Nevertheless, five states (Alaska, California, Hawaii, New York, and 
Washington) had legalized or quasi-legalized abortion around 1970. Donohue and Levitt (2001) show that the five states that allowed 
abortion in 1970 experienced declines earlier than the rest of the nation, which legalized in 1973 with Roe v. Wade. However, Joyce 
(2004) argues that Donohue and Levitt's evidence that crime fell earlier and faster in the early legalizing states may be spurious, a 
result of the differential timing in the evolution of crack markets. 
19
 According to Fryer et al. (2005), crack cocaine emerged in the mid-1980s, peaking in the early-1990s, before falling slowly 
thereafter. 
20
 The same analysis was done for the log of property crime, finding no significant impact for any specification.  
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distinguish a statistically significant impact during the first 10 years following the reform, the impact 
concentrates in the mid to long term.  For all five specifications, we find a positive and statistically significant 
impact between 7 and 20 years after the introduction of unilateral divorce. However, for our preferred 
specification (Column 5) the coefficients are only significant for the 18 years after the reform.  
In Table 3, we break violent crime down into its respective sub-definitions and present the results for the log 
of property crime using our preferred specification from Table 1 (including state-specific time trends). The 
results are in line with Figure 2; the impact on violent crime is driven by the impact on aggravated assault and 
we do not find a statistically significant one on property crime rates. Notice that the impact on aggravated 
assault crime rates, as well as the effect that we find for violent crimes, is only statistically significant 7 years 
after the introduction of unilateral divorce with an average impact of approximately 11 percent on the period 
under analysis. That is, those states that moved to unilateral reform faced an increase of approximately 28 
offenses per 100,000 people that qualify as aggravated assault in relationship to non-adopting states. Finally, 
for some years we also find a significant impact on murder rate.  
We check the robustness in the results by analyzing the timing of the changes and the sensitivity of the 
selection of the control group. A causal interpretation of the previous findings would be undermined if we 
found that crimes rates were falling or increasing in adopting states prior to the enactment of unilateral 
divorce, compared with non-adopting states. In order to examine these issues, we add a series of leads to 
equation (1), coding dummies for whether the unilateral divorce law would be passed in 1–2 years, 3–4 years, 
and so on. Figure 3 shows the results for this modified specification. For all crime rates, with the exception of 
forcible rape, the coefficients of the dummies indicating the period prior to the divorce law reform are all non-
statistically significant, and in no case are they (individually or jointly) statistically distinguishable from zero. 
Finally, Table 4 replicates Table 2 just keeping adopting states. The results confirm our previous findings; 
unilateral divorce had a long run positive impact on violent crime rates, specifically on aggravated assault 
rates and, for some years on murder rates.  
Arrest Rates: Heterogeneity by Race and Age Group 
The introduction of unilateral divorce, in accordance with our previous findings, increases violent offenses; 
among them aggravated assault, and depending on the specification, murder rates. Now, using arrest data 
disaggregated by race and age, we analyze which groups are the most affected by the reform. Table 5 reports 
the estimates of model (1) for murder arrest rates (Columns 1 to 4), and for aggravated assault arrest rates 
(Columns 5 to 8). For each type of crime, we split the samples between the White and Black sub-samples. For 
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aggregate murder arrest rates, Column 1 shows that the impact of the reform is non-monotonic. For the first 
four years the reform is associated with an approximately 21% increase in the murder arrest rates. 
Nevertheless for the fifth to the tenth year after the reform, we observe a reduction of the point estimates (and 
insignificant at 5%), which after the eleventh year following the reform start to rise and becoming significant 
again.  Splitting the samples by race, we observe that this pattern is driven by the sample of Blacks, while for 
the White sub-sample, we only find effects for the four years following the reform. For aggravated assault 
rates, we also observe that the findings for the full sample are driven by the Black sample, but here we do not 
distinguish an immediate impact after the reform. For the overall period under analysis, our findings are 
equivalent to an average annual increase of approximately 30 percent in the murder arrest rate, and an 
approximately 39 percent increase in the case of aggravated assault arrest rates. Finally, in Columns 5 and 8 
we repeat the analysis for the murder and aggravated assault arrest rates of Blacks using Gruber (2004) 
coding. The robustness of the results to this alternative coding is particularly important. Since Gruber 
classifies as “non-adopting” those states that, having unilateral divorce, also have separation requirements, the 
states of Illinois, New Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina and the District of Columbia are under this 
coding of “control” states.21  
The above findings suggest, first, that most of the mid to long run impact appears to come from the sample of 
African-Americans. Unfortunately, very little research has been done on the impact of the reform on African-
Americans. However, in a very recent paper, Cáceres-Delpiano and Giolito (2008) find, using the 1970-1990 
Census, that young black men aged 16-25 who were younger than age 4 at the time of the reform are more 
likely to be living in an institution than other black men from the same age group that were not exposed to 
unilateral divorce. 
A characteristic of these types of offenses is that they are concentrated among younger age groups.  
Therefore, and given the characteristics of these offenses, we should see a higher relative impact among 
younger age groups. In order to check this, we split arrest rates by age of the arrestee. Tables 6 and 7 report 
the estimates of model (1) by five age groups for murder and aggravated assault arrest rates, respectively. 
Consistent with the types of crime being affected by the reform, we observe that the increase in arrest rates 
occurs among the younger age groups with non statistically significant impact for over-25 age groups. 
Specifically, the main impacts are concentrated among individuals between the ages of 15 and 19. Unlike 
previous results based on aggregated rates, the results for the group of 15-19 year-olds are now significant for 
almost the whole period. This finding is consistent with an average annual increase of approximately 40 
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 In addition, Gruber (2004) considers Delaware as an adopting state, unlike Friedberg (1998). See Table 1. 
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percent in the murder arrest rate (an increase of approximately 5 annual arrests per 100,000 people), and an 
approximately 35 percent increase in the average annual rate for aggravated assault (an annual increase of 60 
arrests per 100,000 habitants). For the group of 20-24 year olds we observe that the impact of unilateral 
divorce is only present for the first 4 years after the reform and for the period 13 to 14 years after its 
introduction in the case of murder arrest rates, with no significant impact for any period in the case of 
aggravated assault. This pattern is consistent with an earlier start in relatively less serious offenses like 
aggravated assault, and a later escalation to more serious offenses like murder. The lack of a significant 
impact beyond the fourth year after the reform for the murder arrest rate for the age groups 15-19 and 20-24 
might be mechanical. An earlier arrest implies that some individuals are locked up for a time, preventing them 
from engaging in crime. For the period 1981-1995 the average time served for juveniles convicted for murder 
was approximately 112 months (approximately 9 years)
22
, which almost matches the 8 years in which we do 
not observe an impact until the period 13 to 14 years after the introduction of unilateral divorce when younger 
cohorts arrive on the scene. Evidence in criminology is consistent with our findings. The types of crime 
affected by the reform and the timing of these impacts provide some explanation about the channels through 
which the reform is affecting crime. Family structure is an element producing desistance from crime but its 
impact on crime depends on the point in the life cycle in which it occurs. Divorce not only increases the 
chances of a longer crime career but also increases the chances of more serious offenses (Laub and Sampson, 
2001).  Our findings of mid to long term impact on violent-crimes are consistent with an effect on younger 
age groups who are negatively affected by the reform as children (Gruber, 2004; Cáceres-Delpiano and 
Giolito, 2008). In the next section, we further investigate this hypothesis by analyzing age-specific arrest and 
murder rates. In fact, this consequent increase in the likelihood of falling into crime earlier is by itself a 
predictor of committing serious offenses (violent crime). We investigate these hypotheses in more detail in 
the next section.  
5.  Age-Specific Arrest and Homicide Rates  
The evidence so far points towards an impact of unilateral divorce on violent crime (murder and aggravated 
assault), principally in the mid to long term for the 15-24 age group. The analysis by race showed that the 
findings for the aggregate rates appear to follow closely from the ones for Blacks sub-sample. In this section, 
we introduce a second specification that allows us, first, to identify more precisely the group of the population 
most affected by the reform and, second, to introduce additional controls to check the robustness of previous 
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 Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Department of Justice. http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/html/cjusew96/ts.htm . 
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results. We concentrate on age-specific arrests and murder (SHR) rates of the population aged 15-24, since 
the Uniform Crime Reports record arrests by single year of age for this group only. In order to construct age-
specific arrest and homicide rates we rely on the single-age population counts from the Census US Intercensal 
County Population Data, which is available for all years starting in 1970 (see data Appendix). Therefore, we 
restrict our analysis on age-specific arrest rates to the period starting in 1970.
23
  Our second specification is 
the following: 
, (2) 
with yast now representing a crime rate for the population of age a, living in state s at year t.
24
  Here , , , 
 and  represent state, year, age, state-year, age-year and state-age fixed effects, respectively. 
Furthermore,  is a dummy variable representing whether abortion was already legalized in state s in 
the year of birth of population that is a years old at time t; 1{*} is an indicator function that takes a value of 
one when the logic statement * is true, and zero otherwise. YBast is the year of birth for individuals of age a at 
time t living in the state s; YUnis is the year of adoption of unilateral divorce in the state s. That is, 
 represents the age at the time of introduction of the reform. The parameter of interest, , can be 
interpreted as the ceteris paribus contribution of unilateral divorce of those cohorts of ages in the range 
[   at the time of the reform, compared to those individuals living in states that have not adopted 
unilateral divorce . Seven age groups at the time of the introduction of unilateral divorce are 
defined; Born after the reform > 0), between 0 and 3 years old at the time of the reform, 
between 4 and 7, 8 and 11 and so on. In this last specification, three are the source of variation of the variable 
associated to the parameter . In addition to the differences in the timing of adoption of unilateral divorce 
and the fact that not all states have introduced it, we use in the specification the fact that the reform affected 
individuals at different points in their lives.  
This specification also allows us to control for confounding factors that vary on the state-year level, that is, 
they affect everyone within a state in a particular year. One example of these factors are the temporary state-
specific crime waves such us the introduction of new, illicit drugs, such as crack cocaine (Donohue and 
Levitt, 2001, 2004, 2006; Joyce, 2004, Foote and Goetz, 2005). Given that here the source of variation is by 
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 However, we obtain similar results if we construct rates back to 1965 by using linear interpolations of Census data. 
24
 Due to the high number of zeros in age-specific crime data, here we calculate elasticities evaluated at the sample mean instead of 
using logs, as we did in previous sections. 
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state-year-age, we are able to introduce state-year, state-age and age-year interactions (Foote and Goetz, 2005; 
Donohue and Levitt, 2006) and therefore remove any confounding effect operating at the state-year level, 
state-age level or year-age level.  
Table 8 presents the results for murder, robbery, aggravated assault, violent and property arrest rates using our 
second specification. First, in contrast to our previous specifications, we now also find a significant impact for 
robbery and property arrest rates. Nevertheless, the relative impact is still more important for murder and 
aggravated assault arrest rates. Second, the coefficients for murder arrest rates are only significant for those 
individuals aged 4 years old or more at the time of the reform, with higher point estimates for those aged 20-
24 when the law was passed. A similar pattern appears for robbery rates, significant for those who were older 
than 12. However, for aggravated assault the coefficients are increasing for the younger the individuals were 
at the time of the reform. 
As we already mentioned, murder information, in general, is less likely than other types of offenses to suffer 
from measurement problems. The robustness for murder rates is shown in Table 9, which presents the 
estimates for murder arrest rates with each column representing a different specification. Observe that the 
results are virtually the same when we replace the variable “legal” by directly including the abortion rates at 
the year of birth (Donohue and Levitt, 2001, 2004, 2006). We also check our results by considering two 
alternative unilateral divorce codings: Friedberg (1998) without separation requirements (i.e. the states that 
require time of separation in order to grant a divorce are considered non-adopting) and Gruber (2004).
25
 In all 
cases, the point estimates for individuals who were 20-24 years old at the time of the reform are considerably 
higher than the coefficients for other age groups.  
Finally, in Table 10, we also verify the robustness of our findings in murder arrest rates using homicide rates 
constructed from SHR data, available from 1976 to 1999. The results are very similar to those from arrest 
data, except that we do not observe the increase in the estimates for those individuals aged 20-24 at the time 
of the reform, probably because the period under analysis starts six years later. 
When analyzing the murder arrest rates for the age group 15-24 by the timing since adoption of the law (Table 
6, Columns 1 to 3), we find a significant increase in the first four years after the reform. The short-run 
increase for individuals aged 20-24 in Table 6 is equivalent to the result for those aged 20-24 at the time of 
the reform we showed in Table 9.  This group is the least likely to be affected by parental family disruption 
                                                   
25
 Gruber (2004) considers unilateral divorce only in the case where there are no separation requirements. 
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because of the reform. In fact, some of these individuals could have already left the parents‟ household when 
unilateral divorce was introduced. The higher impact for this group might be linked to their own marriage 
disruption, or the greater selection into marriage caused by the law (Stevenson, 2007, Rasul, 2004) that may 
have prevented some marginal individuals from the benefits of marriage, a key factor in criminal desistance 
according to the criminology literature (Sampson, Laub and Wimer, 2006). 
It is also worth noticing that the point estimates for murder arrests and SHR homicide rates (Tables 9 and 10) 
do not show a significant impact for those groups born after the reform. This lack of significance raises some 
doubts about the long-term effects (more than 20 years after the reform) that are shown in Table 6 for the age 
group 15 to 19. Since we are now controlling for confounding factors at the state-year level, we may interpret 
that the negative effects fade for children born after the reform, consistent with a better selection into 
marriage and the decrease in the divorce rates 10 years after the reform.  However, our findings in aggravated 
assault arrest rates, which appear to be increasing for the youngest cohorts exposed to unilateral divorce, are 
consistent with the long run increase in aggregate arrest rates (Table 5 and Table 7, Column 2), and therefore 
striking.  
6. Conclusion 
In this paper, we study the impact of unilateral divorce on crime. Previous research has suggested that divorce 
laws affected marriage selection and produced some negative effects on individuals who faced the reform as 
children. Here we study whether those changes affected crime and arrest rates in states that passed unilateral 
divorce laws. 
First, using data from the FBI´s Uniform Crime Report program for the period 1965-1998 and differences in 
the timing in the introduction of the reform we find that unilateral divorce has a positive impact on violent 
crime rates, with an 8% to 12% average increase for the period under consideration. The analysis using arrest 
data not only confirms the findings of a positive impact on violent crime but also that these impacts are 
concentrated among those age groups (15 to 24) which are more likely to engage in these type of offenses. 
Specifically for the group of 15-19 year olds, we observe an average impact over the period under analysis of 
40% and 36% for murder and aggravated assault arrest rates, respectively. When we disaggregate the arrest 
rates by race, we find the results are driven by the Black sub-sample, while for the White sub-sample, we only 
find effects for the four years following the reform. 
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We finally analyze age-specific arrest and murder rates using the age at the reform as the second source of 
variation. We are not only able to confirm the positive impact on different types of violent crime but we also 
find a positive impact for property crimes. The results for murder arrest rates for the period 1970-1997 and for 
homicide rates for the period 1976-1999 (Supplemental Homicide Report) are robust with respect to 
specifications, specifically those that include year-state and year-age dummies.  The results confirm, except 
for the case of aggravated assault, that individuals who were already born at the time of the reform (aged 4 
and older for murder) are the ones who face the increase in the probability of engaging in crime. The 
magnitude goes from 15% to 40% depending on the specification and age at the time of the reform. 
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Data Appendix 
Unilateral Divorce Coding 
The coding for unilateral divorce and separation requirements comes from Friedberg (1998). The coding for 
equitative division of property is from Rasul (2004). The coding for requirements of fault regarding property 
division is from Mechoulan (2005). See Table 1 for details. 
Aggregate Crime and Arrest Data 
Aggregate crime and arrest data used in the analysis are from FBI´s Uniform Crime Report program (UCR) 
for the period 1965-1998. The UCR data has information for the whole period 1960-2005 with the exception 
of New York (since 1965). The data on crime rates is available from the Bureau of Justice Statistics web 
page:  
http://bjsdata.ojp.usdoj.gov/dataonline/Search/Crime/State/StatebyState.cfm 
Arrest data is from Chilton and Weber (2000), available from the Inter-University Consortium for Political 
and Social Research (ICPSR) web page:  http://www.icpsr.umich.edu. 
Supplemental Homicide Reports (SHR) 
Data from SHR is from Fox (2004), available from the ICPSR web page: http://www.icpsr.umich.edu. 
Prisoners, and Death Penalty  
Data on number of prisoners and the existence of death penalty are from Donohue and Wolfers (2005), 
available at Justin Wolfers‟ web page: http://bpp.wharton.upenn.edu/jwolfers/DeathPenalty.shtml. The 
variable indicating the stock of incarcerated people have same states missing for the years 1965, 1968 and 
1970-72.  
Population 
Population counts by year and state are taken form Donohue and Wolfers (2005). For counts at year-state-age 
level, we use the Census US Intercensal Population Data, which is available for all years starting in 1970. The 
data is available at the NBER website:  http://www.nber.org/data/census-intercensal-population/ 
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For population counts at the state-race-year level, we use data from the National Cancer Institute, Surveillance 
Epidemiology and End Results, available at http://seer.cancer.gov/popdata/download.html. For the period 
1965-1969, we make a linear interpolation using IPUMS Census data for the years 1960 and 1970. 
Abortion Rates 
Data on abortion rates by state and year is from Donohue and Levitt (2006), available from John J. Donohue 
web page: http://islandia.law.yale.edu/donohue/pubsdata.htm.  
Welfare Generosity, Unemployment rate, and Log of per capita Income 
The data is from the “Moffit Benefits File”, available from Robert Moffit‟s web page: 
http://www.econ.jhu.edu/people/moffitt/ben_data.txt.  
Demographic Covariates 
The share of Population living in Metropolitan areas , fraction of people below the poverty line, fraction of 
blacks and the age structure of the population (5-year cohorts) are constructed from March CPS data starting 
in 1977. Since for previous years some states are grouped in March CPS, we make a lineal interpolation using 
IPUMS census data. The share of foreign-born population is also by linear interpolation of census data 
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Table 1 
Divorce Regulations In the United States 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
Unilateral 
Divorce  
(Friedberg, 
1998) 
Unilateral 
Divorce  
(Gruber, 
2004) 
Equitable 
Division 
of 
Property 
and 
Assets 
Separation 
Requirements 
for Unilateral 
Divorce 
No Fault for 
Property 
division and 
Alimony 
 
Unilateral 
Divorce  
(Friedberg, 
1998) 
Unilateral 
Divorce  
(Gruber, 
2004) 
Equitable 
Division 
of 
Property 
and 
Assets 
Separation 
Requirements 
for Unilateral 
Divorce 
No Fault 
for 
Property 
division 
and 
Alimony 
            
Alabama 1971 1971 1980 No Fault Montana 1975 1973 1976 No 1975 
Alaska 1950 1935 pre 1950 No 1974 Nebraska 1972 1972 1972 No 1972 
Arizona 1973 1973 pre 1950 No 1973 Nevada 1973 1967 pre 1950 No 1973 
Arkansas   1979 No 1979 New Hampshire 1971 1971 1988 No Fault 
California 1970 1970 pre 1950  1970 New Jersey 1971  1971 18 months 1980 
Colorado 1971 1972 1972 No 1971 New Mexico 1973 1933 pre 1950 No 1976 
Connecticut 1973 1973 1973 No Fault New York   1962  Fault 
Delaware  1968 pre 1950  1974 North Carolina Pre-1968  1981  1 year Fault 
District of  Columbia 1977  1977  1 year Fault North Dakota 1971 1971 pre 1950 No Fault 
Florida 1971 1971 1988 No 1986 Ohio 1974  1990  1 year Fault 
Georgia 1973 1973 1980 No Fault Oklahoma Pre-1968 1953 1975 No 1975 
Hawaii 1973 1972 1955 No 1960 Oregon 1973 1971 1971 No 1971 
Idaho 1971 1971 pre 1950 No 1990 Pennsylvania 1980  1979 3 year Fault 
Illinois 1984  1977 2  year 1977 Rhode Island 1976 1975 1979 No Fault 
Indiana 1973 1973 1958 No 1973 South Carolina 1969  1979 1 Fault 
Iowa 1970 1970 pre 1950 No 1972 South Dakota 1985 1985 pre 1950 No Fault 
Kansas 1969 1969 pre 1950 No 1990 Tennessee   1959  Fault 
Kentucky 1972 1972 1972 No Fault Texas 1974 1970 pre 1950 No Fault 
Louisiana Pre-1968  1978  1 year Fault Utah Pre-1968 1987 pre 1950 1 1987 
Maine 1973 1973 1972 No 1985 Vermont Pre-1968  pre 1950 1 Fault 
Maryland Pre-1968  1969 1 Fault Virginia Pre-1968  1982 No Fault 
Massachusetts 1975 1975 1974 No Fault Washington 1973 1973 pre 1950 No 1973 
Michigan 1972 1972 1983 No Fault West Virginia Pre-1968  1984 1 Fault 
Minnesota 1974 1974 1951 No 1974 Wisconsin 1977 1978 1978 No 1977 
Mississippi   pre 1950  Fault Wyoming 1977 1977 pre 1950 No Fault 
Missouri 1973  1974  2 year Fault       
Note: Columns (1) and (4) are from Friedberg (1998); Column (2) is from Gruber (2004); Column (3) is from Rasul (2004). Column (5) is from Mechoulan (2005). 
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Figure 1: Evolution of Violent Crime and Property Crime Rates. Source: Uniform Crime Report 
 
Figure 2:  Evolution of Violent Crime and Property Crime Rates (1965=100).  
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Table 2 
Effect of Unilateral Divorce Reform on Violent Crime Rates (Percent Change) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  
Basic 
(1) + 
Demographic 
(2) + State 
Aggregate 
(3) + 
Crime 
(4)  + 
Trend 
Mean Crime rate per 100,000 
habitants  427.9 
      
Less than two years since 
adoption 0.0249 0.028 0.0386 0.0342 0.0199 
 [0.0306] [0.0316] [0.0431] [0.0406] [0.0238] 
3-4 years after the change 0.0585 0.0661* 0.076 0.071 0.0412 
 [0.0385] [0.0393] [0.0539] [0.0516] [0.0253] 
5-6 years after the change 0.0804* 0.0880* 0.0923 0.0808 0.0506* 
 [0.0478] [0.0467] [0.0625] [0.0607] [0.0296] 
7-8 years after the change 0.1030* 0.1105** 0.1190* 0.1135* 0.0765** 
 [0.0521] [0.0517] [0.0660] [0.0636] [0.0324] 
9-10 years after the change 0.1080* 0.1188** 0.1221* 0.1100* 0.0691* 
 [0.0575] [0.0575] [0.0686] [0.0648] [0.0393] 
11-12 years after the change 0.1374** 0.1572*** 0.1583** 0.1462** 0.1074** 
 [0.0587] [0.0581] [0.0672] [0.0654] [0.0434] 
13-14 years after the change 0.1498** 0.1720** 0.1732** 0.1583** 0.1195** 
 [0.0645] [0.0649] [0.0748] [0.0725] [0.0465] 
15-16 years after the change 0.1772** 0.1929*** 0.1959** 0.1808** 0.1471** 
 [0.0687] [0.0683] [0.0782] [0.0749] [0.0565] 
17-18 years after the change 0.1935** 0.2124*** 0.2091** 0.1975** 0.1634** 
 [0.0771] [0.0780] [0.0853] [0.0819] [0.0718] 
19-20 years after the change 0.1741** 0.1954** 0.1850** 0.1754** 0.1503* 
 [0.0863] [0.0885] [0.0913] [0.0868] [0.0877] 
More than 20 years after the 
change 0.1692 0.1972* 0.1886* 0.1758* 0.1508 
 [0.1088] [0.1082] [0.1062] [0.0982] [0.1128] 
      
Mean crime rate average 
effect over 20 years after the 
reform 0.108** 0.120** 0.122** 0.117** 0.084** 
 [0.049] [0.049] [0.060] [0.056] [0.034] 
      
Obs. (1965-1998) 1,734 1,734 1,734 1,715 1,715 
Robust standard errors clustered by state of residence; * significance at 10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1%. Models in Column (1), “Basic”, include 
dummies by state of residence and dummies by year. "Demographic” includes the fraction per state and year of Afro-American population, 
people under the poverty line, fraction of immigrants, living in metropolitan area, the state-year age structure and interaction of the fraction of 
blacks with the measure of poverty, and fraction in a metropolitan area. "State aggregate” includes as covariates the log of state per capita 
income, the state unemployment rate, dummies for the requirement of fault for property division, separation requirements, and for the existence 
of norms regarding the equitable division of property in the case of divorce. "Crime” includes as covariates dummies for the existence of death 
penalty, abortion accessibility and early legalizing states, the lagged incarcerated population and a dummy for the crack introduction in the late 
80's. This last dummy variable is interacted with the poverty rate, metropolitan area and Afro-American population. Finally, the last 
specification includes a linear trend whose impact is allowed to vary by state of residence. 
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Table 3 
Effect of Unilateral Divorce Reform on Violent Crime Rates (Percent Change) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  
Murder 
Forcible 
Rape 
Robbery 
Aggravated 
Assault 
Property 
Mean Crime rate per 100,000 habitants 7.6 28.9 147.3 244.1 4120.741 
      
Less than two years since adoption 0.0373 0.0381 0.0156 0.0179 0.0206 
 [0.0282] [0.0319] [0.0342] [0.0327] [0.0151] 
3-4 years after the change 0.0252 0.0346 0.0323 0.0375 0.0005 
 [0.0349] [0.0461] [0.0429] [0.0401] [0.0234] 
5-6 years after the change 0.0504 0.0547 0.0173 0.0637 -0.0301 
 [0.0440] [0.0487] [0.0442] [0.0491] [0.0284] 
7-8 years after the change 0.0742 0.0589 0.0103 0.1098* -0.0251 
 [0.0533] [0.0525] [0.0445] [0.0582] [0.0279] 
9-10 years after the change 0.0873 0.0527 -0.0031 0.1063 -0.0234 
 [0.0637] [0.0519] [0.0478] [0.0678] [0.0372] 
11-12 years after the change 0.0983 0.1023* 0.026 0.1392** -0.0132 
 [0.0623] [0.0566] [0.0570] [0.0666] [0.0441] 
13-14 years after the change 0.1492** 0.0833 0.0855 0.1261* 0.0023 
 [0.0673] [0.0614] [0.0639] [0.0726] [0.0471] 
15-16 years after the change 0.1470* 0.0734 0.088 0.1716* 0.0112 
 [0.0774] [0.0790] [0.0805] [0.0871] [0.0543] 
17-18 years after the change 0.1375 0.0989 0.0382 0.2158** -0.0095 
 [0.0891] [0.0978] [0.1029] [0.1032] [0.0646] 
19-20 years after the change 0.1217 0.0916 0.0294 0.1889 -0.0251 
 [0.1089] [0.1057] [0.1160] [0.1197] [0.0685] 
More than 20 years after the change 0.1646 0.0549 0.0805 0.1618 0.0023 
 [0.1471] [0.1168] [0.1410] [0.1402] [0.0732] 
      
Mean crime rate average effect over 20 
years after the reform 0.081 0.068 0.026 0.115** -0.0097 
 [0.054] [0.054] [0.051] [0.057] [0.036] 
      
Obs. (1965-1998) 1,715 1,715 1,715 1,715 1,715 
Robust standard errors clustered by state of residence; * significance at 10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1%. Models in Column (1), “Basic”, 
include dummies by state of residence and dummies by year.  "Demographic” includes the fraction per state and year of Afro-American 
population, people under the poverty line, fraction of immigrants, living in metropolitan area, the state-year age structure and interaction of 
the fraction of blacks with the measure of poverty, and fraction in a metropolitan area. "State aggregate” includes as covariates the log of 
state per capita income, the state unemployment rate, dummies for the requirement of fault for property division, separation requirements, 
and for the existence of norms regarding the equitable division of property in the case of divorce. "Crime” includes as covariates dummies 
for the existence of death penalty, abortion accessibility and early legalizing states, the lagged incarcerated population and a dummy for the 
crack introduction in the late 80's. This last dummy variable is interacted with the poverty rate, metropolitan area and the fraction of 
blacks. Finally, the last specification includes a linear trend whose impact is allowed to vary by state of residence. 
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Figure 3: Impact of Unilateral Divorce on Selected Crime Rates 
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Table 4 
Impact of Unilateral Divorce: Sample of Adopting States.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Violent Murder Forcible Rape Robbery 
Aggravated 
 Assault 
      
Less than two years since adoption 0.0115 0.0327 0.0358 0.0221 -0.0008 
 [0.0240] [0.0203] [0.0353] [0.0404] [0.0259] 
3-4 years after the change 0.024 0.0184 0.0396 0.0354 0.0177 
 [0.0233] [0.0269] [0.0472] [0.0446] [0.0278] 
5-6 years after the change 0.0409 0.0609 0.0564 0.0317 0.0504 
 [0.0281] [0.0383] [0.0509] [0.0468] [0.0366] 
7-8 years after the change 0.0666* 0.0828 0.0607 0.0219 0.0983* 
 [0.0354] [0.0499] [0.0539] [0.0517] [0.0504] 
9-10 years after the change 0.0782* 0.1150* 0.0587 0.0188 0.1166* 
 [0.0426] [0.0655] [0.0576] [0.0562] [0.0605] 
11-12 years after the change 0.1314** 0.1245 0.1088* 0.0456 0.1767*** 
 [0.0484] [0.0768] [0.0644] [0.0712] [0.0626] 
13-14 years after the change 0.1549*** 0.1673* 0.0786 0.089 0.1865** 
 [0.0556] [0.0902] [0.0773] [0.0918] [0.0695] 
15-16 years after the change 0.1973** 0.1795* 0.0645 0.0886 0.2556*** 
 [0.0736] [0.1002] [0.0960] [0.1195] [0.0876] 
17-18 years after the change 0.2334** 0.1712 0.0536 0.0355 0.3434*** 
 [0.0896] [0.1176] [0.1192] [0.1540] [0.1010] 
19-20 years after the change 0.2478** 0.1621 0.0493 0.0316 0.3585*** 
 [0.1012] [0.1458] [0.1289] [0.1799] [0.1133] 
More than 20 years after the change 0.2792** 0.1939 0.0041 0.079 0.3831*** 
  [0.1146] [0.1860] [0.1388] [0.2091] [0.1219] 
Robust standard errors clustered by state of residence; * significance at 10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1%. Other covariates are dummies by 
state and year, the fraction per state and year of Black population, poverty rate, percentage of immigrants, fraction of the population living 
in metropolitan area, the state-year age structure and interaction of the fraction blacks with the measure of poverty, and fraction in a 
metropolitan area. We also include as covariates the log of state per capita income, the state unemployment rate, dummies for the 
requirement of fault for property division, dummies for separation requirements and dummies for the existence of norms regarding the 
equitable division of property in the case of divorce. Finally, we also include a dummy variable that indicates whether a state allows 
abortion, a dummy variable for the existence of death penalty, the lagged incarceration population, and a dummy for the crack introduction 
in the mid-late 80’s. This last dummy variable is interacted with the poverty rate, fraction of population living in a metropolitan area and 
fraction of blacks in a state in a specific year. A linear trend whose impact is allowed to vary by state of residence is also included. 
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Table 5 
Effect of Unilateral Divorce Reform on Arrest Rates: Total and by Race 
         
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
Murder Arrests Aggravated Assault Arrest 
 
All  
White 
Only 
Black 
Only 
Black 
(Gruber, 
2004) 
All  
White 
Only 
Black 
Only 
Black 
(Gruber, 
2004) 
          
Mean Arrest rate per 100,000 habitants 5.98 2.97 30.97 96.14 64.69 386.32 
          
Less than two years since adoption 0.2157*** 0.1718** 0.2364*** 0.2760*** 0.1391 0.0948 0.1628 0.1523 
 [0.0696] [0.0804] [0.0696] [0.0865] [0.0917] [0.0996] [0.1024] [0.0986] 
3-4 years after the change 0.2145*** 0.1812** 0.2098** 0.2792** 0.2162* 0.1476 0.247 0.2076* 
 [0.0697] [0.0834] [0.0828] [0.1242] [0.1287] [0.1263] [0.1625] [0.1117] 
5-6 years after the change 0.1230* 0.0966 0.0861 0.3042* 0.2218 0.1553 0.2295 0.1469 
 [0.0708] [0.0728] [0.0959] [0.1534] [0.1572] [0.1464] [0.2077] [0.1425] 
7-8 years after the change 0.1471* 0.0437 0.1652* 0.4403** 0.2928 0.1844 0.3097 0.1121 
 [0.0828] [0.0894] [0.0924] [0.1667] [0.2017] [0.1760] [0.2715] [0.1603] 
9-10 years after the change 0.1557 -0.0043 0.2068 0.6918*** 0.2899** 0.1554 0.3418* 0.2142 
 [0.1285] [0.0957] [0.1630] [0.1909] [0.1417] [0.1492] [0.2016] [0.1739] 
11-12 years after the change 0.3134** 0.1125 0.3893** 0.9355*** 0.4295** 0.2597 0.5157* 0.2779 
 [0.1275] [0.1055] [0.1763] [0.2310] [0.1952] [0.1816] [0.2773] [0.2159] 
13-14 years after the change 0.4579*** 0.1775 0.5705*** 1.1306*** 0.4754** 0.2699 0.6004* 0.3023 
 [0.1477] [0.1254] [0.2060] [0.2443] [0.2218] [0.2086] [0.3087] [0.2406] 
15-16 years after the change 0.3951** 0.1518 0.5168** 1.1208*** 0.5113* 0.2988 0.6289* 0.2535 
 [0.1867] [0.1545] [0.2491] [0.2882] [0.2559] [0.2503] [0.3369] [0.2457] 
17-18 years after the change 0.5000** 0.2274 0.6298** 1.1961*** 0.7078** 0.4607 0.8812** 0.4615* 
 [0.2041] [0.1862] [0.2670] [0.2696] [0.2890] [0.2884] [0.3688] [0.2476] 
19-20 years after the change 0.5740** 0.3032 0.7096** 1.3243*** 0.8211** 0.5801* 0.9850** 0.5472** 
 [0.2402] [0.2077] [0.3269] [0.3332] [0.3266] [0.3131] [0.4141] [0.2602] 
More than 20 years after the change 0.6002** 0.3329 0.6820* 1.3596*** 0.9472** 0.6803* 1.1226** 0.6279** 
 [0.2935] [0.2595] [0.3808] [0.3844] [0.3785] [0.3566] [0.4797] [0.2886] 
          
Mean crime rate average effect over 20 
years after the reform 0.2994*** 0.1349 0.3744** 0.7174*** 0.3896** 0.2473212 0.4597* 0.2478 
 [0.1097] [0.1034] [0.1408] [0.1808] [0.1693] [0.1610} [0.2350] [0.1587] 
         
Observations 1,567 1,559 1,382 1,382 1,599 1,599 1,544 1,544 
Robust standard errors clustered by state of residence; * significance at 10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1%. Other covariates are dummies by state and year, the 
fraction per state and year of the black population, poverty rate, percentage of immigrants, fraction of the population living in metropolitan area, the state-year 
age structure and interaction of the fraction of blacks with the measure of poverty, and fraction in a metropolitan area. We also include as covariates the log of 
state per capita income, the state unemployment rate, dummies for the requirement of fault for property division, dummies for  separation requirements and 
dummies for the existence of norms regarding the equitable division of property in the case of divorce. Finally, we also include a dummy variable that indicates 
whether a state allows abortion, a dummy variable for the existence of death penalty, the lagged incarceration population, and a dummy for the crack 
introduction in the mid-late 80’s. This last dummy variable is interacted with the poverty rate, fraction of population living in a metropolitan area  and fraction 
blacks in a state in a specific year. A linear trend whose impact is allowed to vary by state of residence is also included. 
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Table 6 
Effect of Unilateral Divorce on Murder Arrest Rates by Age Group (Percent Change) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  
15-24 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 
Mean Arrest rate per 100,000 habitants 12.83 12.24 13.65 9.73 7.17 
      
Less than two years since adoption 0.1637*** 0.1869** 0.1289** 0.0855 0.0578 
 [0.0559] [0.0717] [0.0591] [0.0534] [0.0642] 
3-4 years after the change 0.1994*** 0.2143** 0.1558** 0.0377 0.0317 
 [0.0665] [0.0843] [0.0697] [0.0835] [0.0777] 
5-6 years after the change 0.1627 0.1672 0.1078 0.0162 -0.0711 
 [0.0991] [0.1173] [0.1044] [0.1061] [0.1050] 
7-8 years after the change 0.2146** 0.2557* 0.1324 0.006 -0.0853 
 [0.1018] [0.1319] [0.0927] [0.0943] [0.0903] 
9-10 years after the change 0.2383 0.3052 0.129 -0.0263 -0.1664 
 [0.1831] [0.2293] [0.1632] [0.1880] [0.1749] 
11-12 years after the change 0.3700** 0.4725** 0.206 0.0355 -0.0921 
 [0.1709] [0.2273] [0.1494] [0.1412] [0.1607] 
13-14 years after the change 0.4899*** 0.5887** 0.3371** 0.0799 -0.0193 
 [0.1794] [0.2316] [0.1562] [0.1573] [0.1854] 
15-16 years after the change 0.4422** 0.5279** 0.2833 -0.0208 -0.2079 
 [0.2108] [0.2510] [0.1937] [0.1788] [0.2016] 
17-18 years after the change 0.4889** 0.5784** 0.3122 -0.0232 -0.1413 
 [0.2117] [0.2672] [0.1933] [0.1912] [0.2078] 
19-20 years after the change 0.5727** 0.6979** 0.3579* 0.0335 -0.2166 
 [0.2268] [0.2741] [0.2131] [0.1863] [0.2180] 
More than 20 years after the change 0.5135** 0.6545** 0.2703 -0.0471 -0.3444 
 [0.2491] [0.3065] [0.2323] [0.2057] [0.2405] 
      
Mean crime rate average effect over 20 years reform  
0.334** 0.402** 0.215* 0.043 -0.061 
 [0.1097] [0.1034] [0.1408] [0.1693] [0.1610} 
      
Observations (1965-1997) 1,567 1,559 1,382 1,599 1,599 
Robust standard errors clustered by state of residence; * significance at 10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1%. Other covariates are dummies by state and 
year, the fraction per state and year of Black population, poverty rate, percentage of immigrants, fraction of the population living in metropolitan 
area, the state-year age structure and interaction of the fraction of blacks with the measure of poverty, and fraction in a metropolitan area. We also 
include as covariates the log of state per capita income, the state unemployment rate, dummies for the requirement of fault for property division, 
dummies for separation requirements and dummies for the existence of norms regarding the equitable division of property in the case of divorce. 
Finally, we also include a dummy variable that indicates whether a state allows abortion, a dummy variable for the existence of death penalty, the 
lagged incarceration population, and a dummy for the crack introduction in the mid-late 80’s. This last dummy variable is interacted with the 
poverty rate, fraction of population living in a metropolitan area and fraction of blacks in a state in a specific year. A linear trend whose impact is 
allowed to vary by state of residence is also included. 
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Table 7 
Effect of Unilateral Divorce on Aggravated Assault Arrest Rates by Age Group (Percent Change) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  
15-24 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 
      
Mean Arrest rate per 100,000 habitants 174.87 173.57 177.1 143.69 115.71 
      
Less than two years since adoption 0.0836 0.1283* 0.0323 0.0463 0.0058 
 [0.0711] [0.0756] [0.0706] [0.0725] [0.0743] 
3-4 years after the change 0.1686 0.2241* 0.0961 0.11 0.0993 
 [0.1129] [0.1158] [0.1171] [0.1143] [0.1287] 
5-6 years after the change 0.2085 0.2762** 0.1077 0.1266 0.1239 
 [0.1379] [0.1350] [0.1474] [0.1441] [0.1579] 
7-8 years after the change 0.2727 0.3503** 0.145 0.1655 0.1614 
 [0.1696] [0.1642] [0.1843] [0.1762] [0.1996] 
9-10 years after the change 0.2289* 0.3186*** 0.0751 0.0987 0.1093 
 [0.1259] [0.1179] [0.1481] [0.1451] [0.1767] 
11-12 years after the change 0.3160* 0.4072*** 0.1429 0.1607 0.1673 
 [0.1650] [0.1472] [0.1951] [0.1900] [0.2141] 
13-14 years after the change 0.2996 0.4142** 0.0867 0.1173 0.1219 
 [0.1862] [0.1646] [0.2184] [0.2229] [0.2351] 
15-16 years after the change 0.2773 0.4102** 0.0276 0.0527 0.078 
 [0.2087] [0.1912] [0.2412] [0.2447] [0.2631] 
17-18 years after the change 0.3405 0.4706** 0.0908 0.1508 0.156 
 [0.2291] [0.2077] [0.2642] [0.2636] [0.2881] 
19-20 years after the change 0.3769 0.5132** 0.1028 0.1499 0.1591 
 [0.2528] [0.2306] [0.2875] [0.2842] [0.3044] 
More than 20 years after the change 0.3689 0.4913* 0.0857 0.1405 0.1572 
 [0.2922] [0.2678] [0.3287] [0.3260] [0.3486] 
    0.0386  
Mean crime rate average effect over 20 
years after the reform 0.266 0.358*** 0.111 0.143 0.1360 
 [0.1097] [0.1034] [0.1408] [0.1693] [0.1610} 
      
Observations (1965-1997) 1,567 1,559 1,382 1,599 1,599 
Robust standard errors clustered by state of residence; * significance at 10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1%. Other covariates are dummies by 
state and year, the fraction per state and year of Black population, poverty rate, percentage of immigrants, fraction of the population living 
in metropolitan area, the state-year age structure and interaction of the fraction of blacks with the measure of poverty, and fraction in a 
metropolitan area. We also include as covariates the log of state per capita income, the state unemployment rate, dummies for the 
requirement of fault for property division, dummies for separation requirements and dummies for the existence of norms regarding the 
equitable division of property in the case of divorce. Finally, we also include a dummy variable that indicates whether a state allows 
abortion, a dummy variable for the existence of death penalty, the lagged incarceration population, and a dummy for the crack introduction 
in the mid-late 80’s. This last dummy variable is interacted with the poverty rate, fraction of population living in a metropolitan area and 
fraction of blacks in a state in a specific year. A linear trend whose impact is allowed to vary by state of residence is also included. 
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Table 8 
Effect of Unilateral Divorce on Age-Specific Arrest Rates.  Age 15-24. (Percent Change) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
Murder Robbery 
Aggravated 
Assault 
Violent Property 
Sample  Mean  19.46 198.90 271.57 517.63 1837.30 
      
Born after the reform 0.2457 -0.0835 0.5461** 0.2642* 0.0710* 
 [0.1507] [0.1231] [0.2340] [0.1320] [0.0355] 
Age 0-3 at time of reform 0.2092 -0.087 0.5331** 0.2547** 0.0685** 
 [0.1444] [0.1010] [0.2169] [0.1024] [0.0275] 
Age 4-7 at time of reform 0.2905*** -0.0187 0.4342** 0.2337** 0.0628** 
 [0.0929] [0.0813] [0.1738] [0.0975] [0.0262] 
Age 8-11 at time of reform 0.2912*** 0.0768* 0.3604*** 0.2326*** 0.0625*** 
 [0.0526] [0.0404] [0.1027] [0.0595] [0.0160] 
Age 12-15 at time of reform 0.3483*** 0.2148*** 0.2840*** 0.2502*** 0.0672*** 
 [0.0321] [0.0302] [0.0330] [0.0205] [0.0055] 
Age 16-19 at time of reform 0.3917*** 0.2211*** 0.2148*** 0.2187*** 0.0588*** 
 [0.0132] [0.0158] [0.0173] [0.0144] [0.0039] 
Age 20 or more at time of reform 0.5058*** 0.1975*** 0.2245*** 0.2222*** 0.0597*** 
 [0.0592] [0.0710] [0.0394] [0.0360] [0.0097] 
      
Observations (1970-1997) 14,280 14,280 14,280 14,280 14,280 
Robust standard errors, clustered by state, in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  Dependent variable is 
murder rate by age per 100,000 people of the age group in a given state and year. Regressions weighted by state population. Coefficients 
represent the rate of change in crime rates for the different cohorts affected by the reform. This elasticity is calculated using the weighted 
sample mean as the base.  All specifications include state, year, age and year of birth fixed effects, age*year, state*age and state*year 
interactions.  
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Table 9 
Effect of Unilateral Divorce Reform on Age-Specific Murder Arrest Rates.  Age 15-24 . 1965-1997 
Sample  Mean (Murder Arrest Rates per 
100,000 people) 16.944 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
  
Basic 
(1) + 
Demographic 
(2) + 
Aggregate 
Interactions Abortion Rates 
Friedberg No 
Sep. 
Gruber Coding 
Born after the reform 0.1081 0.2566 0.1745 0.2457 0.2222 0.0617 0.1826 
 [0.2118] [0.2170] [0.2072] [0.1507] [0.1568] [0.1731] [0.1790] 
Age 0-3 at time of reform 0.1893 0.3136 0.2537 0.2092 0.2241 -0.0066 0.1714 
 [0.1955] [0.1904] [0.1819] [0.1444] [0.1509] [0.1597] [0.1597] 
Age 4-7 at time of reform 0.2545 0.3414** 0.3043* 0.2905*** 0.2850*** 0.0827 0.3103*** 
 [0.1667] [0.1562] [0.1547] [0.0929] [0.0903] [0.1087] [0.1096] 
Age 8-11 at time of reform 0.211 0.2716** 0.2518** 0.2912*** 0.2886*** 0.0858 0.3268*** 
 [0.1340] [0.1141] [0.1232] [0.0526] [0.0500] [0.0730] [0.0658] 
Age 12-15 at time of reform 0.2086 0.2624** 0.2583** 0.3483*** 0.3495*** 0.0869** 0.3353*** 
 [0.1337] [0.1086] [0.1236] [0.0321] [0.0334] [0.0427] [0.0320] 
Age 16-19 at time of reform 0.2242 0.2839** 0.2979** 0.3917*** 0.3902*** 0.1266*** 0.3980*** 
 [0.1395] [0.1174] [0.1331] [0.0132] [0.0133] [0.0160] [0.0220] 
Age 20 or more at time of reform 0.4210*** 0.4831*** 0.5140*** 0.5058*** 0.5062*** 0.3142*** 0.5192*** 
 [0.1498] [0.1292] [0.1459] [0.0592] [0.0605] [0.0515] [0.0636] 
        
Other Divorce laws x x x     
State Demographic Controls  x x     
State  Policy variables   x     
State Aggregate  variables   x     
year *Age  Interactions    x x x x 
State *Age  Interactions    x x x x 
State *year Interactions    x x x x 
        
Observations (1965-1997) 14,280 14,280 14,160 14,280 14,280 14,280 14,280 
Robust standard errors, clustered by state, in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Dependent variable is murder arrest rate by age per 100,000 people of the 
age group in a given state and year. Regressions weighted by state population. Coefficients represent the rate of change in crime rates for the different cohorts affected by the reform. This 
elasticity is calculated using the weighted sample mean as the base.  All specifications include state, age, year and year of birth fixed effects, age*year interactions and a dummy indicating 
whether abortion was already legalized in the state at the year of birth. Other divorce laws include dummies for fault for property division, separation requirements and the existence of norms 
regarding the equitable division of property and assets. Demographic controls include: age structure of the population (5-year cohorts) poverty rate, fraction of the population living in a 
metropolitan area, fraction of Black and fraction of foreign-born population . State Policy variables include existence of the AFDC unemployed parent program, and a dummy indicating the 
existence of the death penalty. State aggregate variables include the log of personal income per capita, the number of prisoners per 100,000 habitants (lagged one year, some state-years missing) 
and the unemployment rate. 
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Table 10 
Effect of Unilateral Divorce Reform on Age-Specific Murder Rates.  Supplemental Homicide Report. Age 15-24. 
(Percent Change) 
         
Sample  Mean (Murder Rates per 100,000 habitants) 25.560 
      
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Friedberg (1998) Coding Friedberg  
(1998) Coding 
(excluding sep. 
Requirements) 
Gruber 
(2004) 
Coding 
  
Basic Interactions 
Abortion Rate 
(Donohue-
Levitt, 2004) 
Born after the reform 0.0124 0.172 0.1898 0.0906 0.0558 
 [0.1959] [0.1224] [0.1322] [0.1296] [0.1312] 
Age 0-3 at time of reform 0.1482 0.2316* 0.2601* 0.135 0.112 
 [0.1737] [0.1229] [0.1308] [0.1320] [0.1383] 
Age 4-7 at time of reform 0.2512 0.2426** 0.2499** 0.17 0.1905* 
 [0.1743] [0.1009] [0.1000] [0.1197] [0.1118] 
Age 8-11 at time of reform 0.2625* 0.2294*** 0.2359*** 0.1972** 0.2258** 
 [0.1448] [0.0605] [0.0593] [0.0954] [0.0876] 
Age 12-15 at time of reform 0.2121** 0.2266*** 0.2344*** 0.2389*** 0.2462*** 
 [0.1052] [0.0235] [0.0241] [0.0630] [0.0556] 
Age 16-19 at time of reform 0.1398* 0.2158*** 0.2176*** 0.2260*** 0.2581*** 
 [0.0823] [0.0207] [0.0213] [0.0381] [0.0278] 
Age 20 or more at time of reform 0.0732 0.2010*** 0.1977*** 0.1635*** 0.1260*** 
 [0.0702] [0.0441] [0.0419] [0.0474] [0.0326] 
      
Observations (1976-1999) 12,240 12,240 12,240 12,240 12,240 
Robust standard errors, clustered by state, in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Dependent variable is murder 
rate by age per 100,000 people of the age group in a given state and year. Regressions weighted by state population. Coefficients represent the rate of 
change in crime rates for the different cohorts affected by the reform. This elasticity is calculated using the weighted sample mean as the base.  All 
specifications include state, year, age and year of birth fixed effects and age*year interactions. Specifications (2) to (5) include state*age, state*year and 
age*year interactions.  
 
